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I. Introduction 
 
 
Abstract 
The world is warming at unnatural rates.  Governments have responded with 
largely slow or insufficient policy to stop this potentially dangerous change.  In the 
United States, where special interests, notably the oil and gas lobby, have incredible 
influence over federal policy and fight to maintain the status quo; little has been 
done to reduce carbon emissions.  This lack of policy at the federal level has placed 
the responsibility on the states to act.  Among the main policy actions states have 
utilized in promoting more renewable energy and reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions is the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).  This standard, which varies 
by state in its specifics, mandates that a certain percentage, by a predetermined 
year, of the energy portfolio within a state must come from renewable sources 
instead of from fossil fuels.   
This study tests several variables within two main categories, economic and 
political, to determine which are most correlated to RPS adoption.  To test economic 
factors, this study examined three variables: state unemployment rate, renewable 
energy production, and fossil fuels production.  First, to test if unemployment levels 
influence adoption, annual data was collected on state unemployment from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Second, to test the impact of renewable energy 
production on adoption, this study used data from the Energy Information 
Administration.  Similar data was used to test the correlation between fossil fuels 
production in a state and RPS adoption.   
 4 
On the political side, two variables were tested.  First, to test the impact of 
political ideology on RPS adoption, this study utilized information from the National 
Council of State Legislatures and the League of Conservation Voters.  Second, the 
impact of state level campaign contributions on adoption was tested using data 
compiled by the National Institute on Money in State Politics.   
Among the variables tested in this study, only high unemployment rates and 
liberal political ideology were significantly correlated with greater adoption of a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard.  The other factors showed no strong relationship to 
RPS adoption.  
 
Keywords: State Energy Policy, Renewable Portfolio Standards, Economy, Politics 
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Initial Thoughts 
Explanation of Variables and Experiment 
This study focuses on the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), a policy 
designed to promote renewable energy at a state level.  While there is still political 
disagreement on the validity of human-caused climate change, there is little 
uncertainty within the scientific community.  Recognizing this, many lawmakers 
have chosen to act to promote more sustainable practices.  This does not mean, 
however, that these actions have always specifically targeted climate change 
mitigation; in many cases the actions come from an environmental lens, but many 
other times there is a strong economic incentive driving policy.  In effect, there are 
two potential motivating forces that compel a state to support the promotion of 
renewable energy policy, political factors and economic factors.  These two main 
influencers of RPS adoption can be further broken down and explained.  
For those state-level politicians who see climate change as a serious risk to 
the world and the people of their state, adoption of renewable energy policy often 
has political explanations.  For some legislators, their constituents or campaign 
contributors support these actions.  In a democratic system where money and 
public support is vital to win reelection, taking actions that gain their support 
should enhance one’s reelection bid.  For this reason, when the major interests in 
the state support increased adoption of renewable energy policy, one would expect 
politicians to follow suit.  This pattern works both ways; when interests line up 
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against climate change mitigation or alternative energy promotion, legislators can 
be expected to oppose action on this issue.   
One of the most consistent and reliable ways to measure the attitudes of 
interest groups towards an issue is to look at financial contributions to campaigns.  
The industry most concerned, both in support and opposition, with the adoption of a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard is the Energy and Utilities sector.  While other 
industries may also experience cost increases due to the changes, the Energy and 
Utilities sector is at the center of the issue.  One would expect this industry to most 
strongly oppose adoption of these standards because the companies will face 
system overhauls, high costs, and possible penalties for noncompliance.  Therefore, 
when an RPS is brought onto the legislative agenda, it is anticipated that this 
industry will spend significant money lobbying to block the legislation.  In states 
where a powerful energy lobby exists, it should be unlikely for the legislature to 
adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. 
On the other hand, there are states in which major energy companies have 
gone against conventional wisdom and supported Renewable Portfolio Standards.  
In states where public opinion is highly supportive of acting to mitigate perceived 
climate change, certain companies see blocking renewable energy legislation as bad 
for their public image.  In this case, in order to look environmentally conscious and 
adaptive to the desires of their customers, they might go against their own self-
interest and support an RPS.  However, this is viewed as an exception; rather it is 
predicted that the majority of companies within the Energy and Utilities sector will 
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act in ways that will be most profitable by maintaining the status quo and opposing 
large, costly changes.   
The second variable tested from a political standpoint focuses on political 
ideology of the state.  Legislators, both on a state level and federal level, are elected 
to act in the best interests of the citizenry when making decisions.  While campaign 
contributions allow for the evaluation of the desires of special interests and wealthy 
donors, they are not always representative of the overall population.  Most voters do 
not make significant contributions to campaigns and so their only impact over 
elections is through voting.  Therefore, when looking at political variables that cause 
the adoption of policy, it is important to examine the influence that voting citizens 
have over policy decisions.  As noted above, due to their assumed desire for 
reelection, politicians must answer to the interests of the people or their current 
term will be their last.  This means that when the public takes a strong stance on an 
issue, lawmakers generally vote accordingly.  This implies that when public opinion 
shifts towards greater support for increasing renewable energy in a state, like 
through a Renewable Portfolio Standard, it is expected that the state will soon 
thereafter respond and adopt this type of policy.   
It is difficult to gather consistent public opinion data at the state level on this 
issue and so an alternative method was deemed necessary to evaluate the level of 
public support for renewable energy legislation.  This study measures public 
opinion and political ideology in two ways.  First, it examines the impact partisan 
control of state governments has and whether there is a higher likelihood of RPS 
adoption under a Democratic or Republican-controlled legislature.  Second, the 
 8 
voting records for federal Members of Congress are analyzed to determine if there is 
any correlation between a party and energy policy.  The hypothesis for this variable 
expects to see a higher positive correlation between the Democratic Party and 
adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard than the Republican Party.  This is 
because the Democratic Party, through rhetoric and policy actions, tends to be more 
supportive of climate change mitigation policy than the Republican Party.  For 
example, the Democratic Party’s platform recognizes the need to address climate 
change, while the Republican Party’s platform does not. 
On the other side of this study is the set of Economically driven variables.  
First, the health of the job market is a driving force behind many important policy 
decisions.  Unemployment rates in a state are critical when discussing adoption of 
Renewable Portfolio Standard.  A large change to the energy sector will cause a shift 
that will greatly impact the jobs in that sector.  There are two possible scenarios that 
could occur when an RPS is adopted by a state.  The first would see increased job 
growth due to the opening of opportunities within the new sector. Under this view, 
legislators might perceive the adoption of an RPS as an opportunity to decrease the 
unemployment rate within a state as more people were hired to power the 
strengthened alternative energy sector.  California is frequently showcased as a 
model for this theory.  As an early adopter of an RPS, it has seen tremendous growth 
in its renewable energy sector.  It has added 75,000 jobs in the solar industry alone, 
more than all the new jobs in its five largest utilities companies combined.   
According to Bernadette Del Chiaro, Executive Director for the California Solar 
Energy Industries Association, “While conventional energy industries are losing 
 9 
jobs, we are seeing record growth” (Penn, 2016).  While California is an 
exceptionally strong example of the success renewable energy policy can have on 
job growth within the industry, similar, smaller results are found elsewhere.   
While some states may see employment gains as a result of adopting an RPS, 
other states are concerned that doing this will result in a loss of jobs.  In these states, 
despite the gains in the renewable sector, the policy might eliminate too many jobs 
in the fossil fuels sector to result in a net gain in employment.  This is because the 
workers trained in fossil fuels work would not be qualified to transition into these 
new jobs.  However, while the counter argument may seem logical, this study 
hypothesizes that adopting a Renewable Portfolio Standard would decrease 
unemployment overall because of the new jobs it would create.  Many of the jobs in 
the energy sector are low skilled positions that require minimal training and so the 
transition for most workers would be relatively painless and smooth.   
The counterargument also assumes that because a Renewable Portfolio 
Standard requires a certain amount of energy coming from renewable sources, the 
fossil fuels industry would be laying off massive numbers of workers.  This may not 
be the case at all; it is not a zero sum game.  Decreasing production is not a 
requirement for the fossil fuels sector and the extra fuel produced with lessened 
demand from the state could be exported for sale to other states or countries.  While 
certain states may face increased unemployment, the majority will benefit and 
reduce unemployment overall as a result of adopting a RPS.  Therefore, the 
hypothesis expects to see states with high levels of unemployment adopt an RPS 
because it could help revitalize the state economy. 
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The second potential factor within the economic hypothesis expects state 
renewable energy market dominance to be positively correlated with the rate of 
Renewable Portfolio Standard adoption.  By committing to this policy, a state is 
pledging to focus on creating a robust renewable energy sector.  States that already 
have a more productive renewable energy sector before RPS adoption will have an 
easier time adapting to the new requirements.  The smaller the transformation is, 
the less the private sector, especially utility companies, will oppose the policy 
because the burden to them will be reduced.  The hypothesis for this factor expects 
to see states that had higher production of energy from renewable sources in the 
past to be more likely to adopt an RPS while states with low renewable energy 
production are expected to have low rates of adoption.  While some states have the 
ability to switch to greater renewable energy generation more easily, others are 
heavily reliant on fossil fuels and see Renewable Portfolio Standards, or the growth 
of renewable energy in general, as a direct threat to one of their most profitable and 
vital industries.   
The third economic variable uses the same data set as factor two, but instead 
focuses on fossil fuels production as a determinant of RPS adoption.   Under this 
hypothesis, the study predicts that states with higher fossil fuels production are 
more likely to oppose Renewable Portfolio Standards.  In the debate over the reality 
of human-caused climate change, there is a group that argues for actions that benefit 
the world and the common good; yet defining the greatest common good is not easy.   
According to Adam Smith, the father of Capitalism, people ultimately act not 
for the good of others “but from their regard to their own self-interest” (Smith, 
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1776).  States may have concern for the environmental impacts, but much like a 
business, the main intent of all actions is to satisfy the shareholders; for states, the 
shareholders are constituents and actors within the private sector.  When a policy is 
not likely to be profitable, there is little chance it will be adopted into law.  In states 
that rely on fossil fuels for much of their economic gains, taking away a portion of 
this profit by gambling on a new, unproven, and costly renewable energy sector 
often doesn’t receive much support.   
The hypothesis for this factor expects that states with high fossil fuels 
production will rarely adopt an RPS because it would be against its economic self-
interests.  The potential counterargument would posit that although a state may rely 
heavily on one industry for a good portion of its economy, growing another sector 
could provide it with even greater economic opportunity, as it can increase its 
exporting abilities to other states or decrease what it must import.  However, the 
study expects to find that the combination of strongly vested interests from the 
fossil fuels industry, the current infrastructure supporting fossil fuels, and the risk 
in proposing change on the existing industry would be too great a deterrent to see 
high rates of RPS adoption. 
 
History Behind Energy Policy in the United States  
Each presidential administration since the 1970’s has contributed to the 
current energy environment in the United States.  President Nixon faced the first 
national oil crisis due to an embargo from OPEC countries in the early 1970s.  This 
caused him to shift the country’s focus towards domestic energy production in an 
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effort to make the United States energy secure in the future (Heiman and Solomon, 
2004).  In the pursuit of energy independence, greater production led to more 
pollution and questions about its effect on the world’s climate.  Climate change first 
became politically salient “in 1976 as the Gerald Ford administration responded to 
concerns raised by counterparts in the Soviet Union” (Rabe, 2010).  President Carter 
created the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).  President Reagan “took a more laissez-faire approach” and 
“virtually eliminated funding for renewable energy research” (Heiman and Solomon, 
2004), (Rabe, 2010).  However, Reagan signed the first legislation aimed at 
preventing the threat of climate change called the Global Climate Protection Act of 
1987.  This bill did little towards “solving the problem or reversing the threat of 
climate change but…[it] initiated a process of ‘greenhouse governance’” (Rabe, 
2010).   
It was not until the next administration, under George H.W. Bush, that 
climate change became a serious political concern, as “a convergence of research 
findings and steamy summers thrust climate change onto the national political 
agenda” (Rabe, 2004).  This research found that over the past two hundred years, 
“atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide have increased by at least thirty percent, 
methane levels have more than doubled, and nitrous oxide levels have climbed by 
fifteen to twenty percent” (Rabe, 2004).  Under Bush, the United States became one 
of the first of over 170 nations to ratify the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which pledged to reach “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere” (Rabe, 2004).  Apart from this, any other 
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initiatives passed during the Bush Administration “did not reflect a comprehensive 
strategy and tended to eschew language such as ‘greenhouse gases’ and ‘carbon 
dioxide’” and relied on “market forces” to bring change (Rabe, 2004), (Heiman and 
Solomon, 2004).  Under Clinton and the beginning of Bush II administrations, there 
was very little action on climate change, including, most notably, Congress’ failure to 
confirm the Kyoto Protocol domestically.  As it became clear the federal government 
was unlikely to pass meaningful climate change legislation, states began to take it 
upon themselves to act.   
Many early states focused energy policy primarily on chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFSs) that deplete the ozone.  It was not until 1991 that Iowa1 became the first 
state to pass a Renewable Portfolio Standard.  RPSs mandate that within a state 
there must be “a designated amount of power from renewable sources as a portion 
of their overall provision of electricity” (Rabe, 2007).  Since then, twenty-eight more 
states have adopted some version of this policy requirement, with eight others 
having voluntary standards.  The regulations vary greatly from state to state, as does 
the motivating factors behind their adoption.  This study attempts to determine the 
main factors that impact the adoption or lack thereof of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards on a state level in the United States. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Note that Iowa passed the first Renewable Portfolio Standard in 1983 but due to a challenge in the 
courts, the standard was not confirmed until 1991.  For the purposes of this study, the date of 
adoption for Iowa will be 1991 because it is the earliest date in which the standard had complete 
legitimacy in the state. 
 14 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Baseline One Data…………………………………………..Page 31 
 
Table 2: Baseline Two Data………………………………………….Page 32 
 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Due to federal inaction on energy reform since the 1990s, states began to 
realize “that the federal government was unlikely to formulate any serious national 
strategy to reduce greenhouse gases” (Rabe, 2004).  In terms of the ability to pass 
meaningful energy reform, states are now “the most responsive, innovative, and 
effective level of government” (Carley, 2009).  In 2004, states already played a 
dominant role in implementing environmental laws; they issued over ninety percent 
of environmental permits and conducted seventy-five percent of all environmental 
enforcement actions (Rabe, 2004).  There are several suggested reasons for this 
state prominence on the environmental stage.  First, unlike in Washington D.C., 
debates on a state level are not paralyzed or as polarized politically because of 
money and special interests and so there are less constraints on the actions of 
lawmakers (Rabe, 2004).  Experts who believe humans are contributing to global 
warming estimate that at least half of the global energy supply needs to be from 
renewable energy sources by 2100 to stabilize the warming.  States that agree with 
this thinking view energy reform as an immediate necessity. (Gerlagh, 2006).  
Second, economic self-interest may drive many states to act.  Preventing climate 
change may protect oceanfront development or the tourism industry in a state, 
increase agricultural productivity, reduce traffic congestion, or diversify energy 
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supply; it is these local impacts that may motivate a state legislature to adopt a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard.   
Despite actions on a state level, there are still significant hurdles for 
Renewable Energy to overcome to be adopted in all fifty states.  In 2013, there were 
171 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity in the United States (Esterly and 
Gelman, 2013).  The Union of Concerned Scientists estimated that by 2020, there 
will need to be 45 GWs more to meet 2007 target goals, with the Global Energy 
Advisors estimating closer to 52 GW of additional capacity being needed (Wiser, 
Namovicz, Gielecki and Smith, 2007).  The problem is that only around 1.0 billion 
dollars of the federal budget of 3.8 trillion dollars goes towards all renewable 
energy research and development (Ellison, 2007).    
In addition to limited funding, renewable energy must overcome the 
following obstacles: price distortions, lack of storage capacity, discriminatory 
transmission system access, and the end of linked utility rate hikes guaranteed to 
cover the additional expenses of renewable generation (Heiman and Solomon, 
2004). Additionally, there are three main reasons for the discrepancy between the 
social and economic benefits of renewables and conventional energy sources 
including: many jurisdictions provide greater subsidies to conventional generation 
sources than renewable sources, the full costs of pollution are not included in the 
cost of conventional energy, and renewables are generated using higher cost 
technologies, despite the decrease in relative costs over time with widespread 
commercialization because of economies of scale (Berry and Laccard, 2001).   
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There are numerous ways for the government, be it at the federal or state 
level, to promote renewable energy growth.   A government can support voluntary 
measures, establish a regulatory energy framework, or provide direct support 
aiming to regulate price or quantities of a specific energy (Espey, 2001).  It can also 
provide tax incentives, create voluntary green power markets, create state 
integrated resource plans, or establish a renewable portfolio standard (Wiser, 
Nomovicz, Gielecki, and Smith, 2007).  Finally, a state can increase taxes on  
polluting sources of energy, provide direct financial support to renewables, assist 
renewables with commercialization through indirect support, or foster voluntary or 
mandatory market shares for renewables. (Berry and Laccard, 2001).   
 As is suggested by the scholars above, mandating that a certain amount of the 
energy market must be from renewable energy, called a Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, is a common method for increasing renewable energy production within a 
state.  There are a number of major economic reasons for the growing popularity of 
the Renewable Portfolio Standard: they maintain continuous incentives for 
renewable producers to seek cost reductions and make sure the extra costs are 
passed onto consumers, they ensure the attainment of a specific market share for 
the renewable energy industry, and they minimize government responsibility 
relative to other measures by placing the burden for change on the energy sector 
and the consumers (Berry and Jaccard, 2001).  As of 2009, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards applied to over fifty percent of the total U.S. electricity load (Chen, Wiser, 
Mills, and Bolinger, 2009).  Wind is expected to be the dominant technology utilized 
by states, contributing sixty percent of new renewable energy in the future, with 
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geothermal being seventeen percent and hydroelectric and solar each contributing 
four percent of incremental renewable energy (Chen, Wiser, Mills, and Bolinger, 
2009).   
There is considerable discussion about how factors surrounding energy 
production contribute to RPS adoption as well.  The factor most frequently 
discussed in existing literature is current renewable energy capacity and the 
potential for increased production in the state.  In a 2008 study, Lyon and Yin found 
that high levels of existing renewable development do not make a state more likely 
to adopt an RPS, while renewable potential does lead to higher adoption rates.  They 
also found this result in a 2007 study.  In 2009, Chandler also found that high 
renewable energy potential led to higher rates of RPS adoption.  However, a study in 
2006 by Vachon and Menz found there was no correlation between either state coal 
production or the percent of electricity produced from fossil fuels and the rate of 
adoption (Vachon and Menz, 2006).  In 2007, Huang also found that coal production 
as a percentage of total generation was not a significant factor in adoption.  In 2010, 
Lyon and Yin found that the level of fossil fuels production doesn’t have a major 
impact on adoption of RPS.  However, in 1994, Ringquist found that higher 
prevalence of the fossil fuels industry had a negative correlation with RPS adoption. 
 There are a number of political factors that contribute to the adoption, or 
lack thereof, of RPSs.  One major political relationship is the level of liberal ideology 
or Democratic control in government being positively correlated with adoption of 
an RPS (Chandler, 2009), (Huang et al, 2007), (Vachon and Menz, 2006), (Lyon and 
Yin, 2010).  A study by Lyon and Yin found that for every 15.79 percent of the total 
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state legislature seats Democrats held, adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
increased by three hundred percent.   
A second factor that is correlated to adoption of RPS is the level of 
government or citizenry support for environmental ideology.  Several studies used 
the scoring system on environmental support produced annually by the League of 
Conservation Voters (LCV) to find this positive correlation (Kalt and Zupan, 1984), 
(Maxwell, Lon and Hacket, 2000).  Carley also found this positive correlation in 
2009.  By contrast, Lyon and Yin in 2010 determined that this factor has little 
influence on the adoption of an RPS.  Other factors mentioned in the literature that 
might impact RPS adoption are the number of state employees per capita working in 
natural resource positions and the presence of an American Solar Energy Society 
(ASES) chapter (Carley, 2009), (Lyon and Yin, 2010).  
 Renewable Portfolio Standards vary dramatically across states and some are 
successfully implemented, while others encounter challenges.  Those RPSs that are 
best able to force change and deliver the best results are those that have 
noncompliance penalties or fines and are designed to account for whether the 
energy market of the state is competitive or a regulated monopoly (Cory and 
Swezey, 2007).  Several scholars have attempted to explain why certain state 
models struggle.  The studies identify a plethora of reasons.  According to Rabe in 
2007, challenges to successful RPS implementation include favoring specific 
renewable energy sources over others and disrupting market competition, limited 
transmission capabilities, and the skepticism states hold towards federal 
intervention and assistance.  In 2007, Cory and Swezey identified additional 
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problems RPS may face, including ambiguous RPS regulations, allowing frequent or 
major rule changes, weak enforcement mechanisms, allowing exemptions or 
waivers too easily.  In 2009, Carley pointed to inadequate policy enforcement, policy 
duration uncertainty, overly aggressive benchmarks, and too much wiggle room 
granted to utilities as the source of the problems.  Finally, in 2007, Wiser, Nomovicz, 
Gielecki and Smith identified uncertainty about duration, meaningless goals, unclear 
enforcement mechanisms, overly aggressive goals, and extensive exemptions as the 
sources of the problems.   
 A number of academics support Renewable Portfolio Standards because of 
their success in increasing renewable energy production.  In some studies, the 
researchers identified a positive correlation between the existence of an RPS and 
renewable energy development (Menz and Vachon, 2006), (Adelaja and Hailu, 
2008), (Press and Arnould, 2009).  Other potential benefits of an RPS include: 
increasing Gross State Product, rising incomes for residents, decreasing emissions, 
declining water use, decreasing price of natural gas, lessening wholesale electric 
costs, disproportionately beneficial growth to the renewable energy industry versus 
the overall energy sector, and improving job markets (Chen, Wiser, Mills, Bolinger, 
2009), (Press and Arnould, 2009).  On this last impact, unemployment rates, there is 
considerable debate as to the effect of an RPS.  While Chen, Wiser, Mills, Bolinger, 
Press, and Arnould noted a correlation between higher unemployment rates and 
adoption of RPS, a study by Lyon and Yin in 2010 found no correlation.  This 
disagreement among current literature makes testing this variable especially 
important as more research is needed to progress towards academic consensus. 
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 In addition to those in support, there are many scholars who oppose or see 
no impact from Renewable Portfolio Standards.  First, a number of scholars question 
the effectiveness of RPSs in accelerating renewable energy production and many see 
the standards as merely “symbolic unless they facilitate change beyond their local 
regions” (Yin and Powers, 2010), (Michaels, 2007), (Bushnell et al, 2007), (Kneifel, 
2008).  Others claim that an RPS is a weak policy and is unwise (Apt et al, 2008), 
(Morrison, 2006), (Horiuchi, 2007).  In 2008, Fischer and Newell stated that an RPS 
is not optimal whether the goal is to reduce greenhouse gases or to promote 
renewable technologies.  Others argue that the cost effectiveness, versus other 
policy options, is low and that the rise in electricity to consumers is great (Press and 
Arnould, 2009), (Mueller, 2006). 
 
Contribution to Literature 
This study will focus on trying to bridge the gap between political and 
economic factors and avoid singular focus on one or the other.  This is crucial 
because unlike many studies in the past, this study acknowledges the likely 
possibility that both factors influence the adoption or lack of adoption of Renewable 
Portfolio Standards.  The variables tested in this study are supported by scholarly 
literature as potential determinants of adoption rate and there is additional value in 
testing the factors together, rather than individuality or with a singular focus on 
political or economic drivers.  Additionally, much literature is outdated, as the 
majority of studies in this realm occurred before all twenty-nine states that 
currently have an RPS had passed the legislation.  This study should prove more 
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accurate in describing the current situation because of the inclusion of all relevant 
states in each test.  Findings should contribute to the overall understanding of 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and the factors that impact their adoption.  
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III. Methodology and Approach 
 
Methods 
 
This study focuses on factors that impact the adoption, or lack thereof, of a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard policy on the state level.  There are many different 
policies that can help expand the renewable energy sector, but an RPS was chosen 
specifically for a number of reasons.  First, this policy option is a clear and public 
statement that the state is committed to moving away from fossil fuels by helping 
the renewable energy sector gain market share and private sector investment.  
Second, an RPS mandates a certain level of change in production and punishes 
noncompliance.  It alleviates ambiguity and helps make the energy sector 
accountable for the change.  Third, it is both a politically and economically 
significant policy that impacts the public and private sector.  The Renewable 
Portfolio Standard was selected as the focus of this study because although the 
implementation of this policy is not always perfect, an RPS represents a state-level 
shift towards greater renewable energy production. 
 The first step in this study was identifying the current situation, the base, 
which exists in the United States as it pertains to the prevalence of RPS.  Data 
collected came from the National Conference of State Legislatures and provided 
information on the states with an RPS and the specifics of each policy.  After the base 
was established, the study began reviewing academic literature to determine a 
grouping of potentially significant independent variables for testing.  This process 
yielded five variables and hypotheses were generated about each.  The two Political 
variables are political ideology and campaign contributions and the three Economic 
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variables are unemployment rate, renewable energy production, and fossil fuels 
production.  In order to test for the level of correlation between the five 
independent variables and the dependent variable, adoption of a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, data collection was necessary. 
 The economic variables were all tested using the data from two federal 
government departments: the Energy Information Administration (EIA), an agency 
of the Department of Energy, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), an agency of 
the Department of Labor.    
Data collected to test the impact the unemployment rate has on state 
adoption of an RPS came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics “Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics.”  This information came in the form of the monthly 
joblessness rate in each state dating back to 1990.  In order to keep the data 
consistent with other factors, the annual unemployment rate was calculated from 
the monthly totals and this information was entered into the main data sheet. 
Values for the two Economic variables pertaining to energy production, the 
current renewable energy production and the level of reliance on fossil fuels were 
determined by using the “Selected States Comparison” tool on the EIA online 
database and including data from all fifty states.  A variety of information was 
compiled from the data sheet on production by sector at the state level.  Because of 
its overall smaller market size, all forms of renewable energy were classified by the 
EIA into a single energy source.  Consequently, this study will group the sources of 
renewable energy into one.  By contrast, fossil fuels production was broken into the 
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following resources: coal, petroleum, and natural gas.  Nuclear energy was also 
reported to complete each energy supply breakdown but was not analyzed.   
The energy data was tested in a regression model in two forms.  To start, for 
each state, total units produced of each type of energy were tested to allow for the 
magnitude of the production volumes to impact the results.  In the second set of 
tests, overall quantities for each energy type were replaced by the percentage of the 
state’s overall energy production those same energy sources each contribute.  This 
helped remove the influence of outliers in terms of total units of production, such as 
Texas, by comparing states on proportionality of different energy sources instead of 
quantity.   
 The political variables, political ideology and campaign contributions, 
utilized data from a number of sources including: the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), and the National 
Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP).  First, in order to test the impact 
campaign contributions have on adoption of an RPS, industry-specific information 
was collected from NIMSP.  Using the database search, contribution data was 
included from the following sectors within the Energy and Natural Resources 
industry: Electric Utilities, Oil and Gas, Mining, Miscellaneous Energy, and 
Miscellaneous Energy & Natural Resources.  This data was then limited to state 
contributions only as far back as 1990.  It must be noted, that as opposed to all other 
data sets in this model, the data available for campaign contributions is seriously 
limited before 1998.  This issue was dealt with during testing and will be explained 
later in the Methods section. 
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 Second, a combination of data from two sources helped test the correlation 
between RPS adoption and political ideology.  The first set was from the National 
Conference on State Legislatures; this provided biennial, election year information 
for each state on partisan control of the state legislature.  Possible values were 
Republican, split, or Democratic control; these answers were coded when entered 
into the main data set for the experiment so that Republican control was a zero, split 
control a one, and Democratic control a two.  The value of this data is that it gives a 
feel for the ideology of the citizens in each state, as the state level government is 
assumed to be representative of their interests because it is closer to the people.   
The second source used for the political ideology variable was the annual 
“National Environmental Scorecard” scores from the League of Conservation Voters.  
This groups all the federal level House of Representatives members from each state 
into a single score so that there are fifty state scores for the House.  The same is 
done for the Senate to create two scores for the level of environmentalism for each 
state.  The scores are determined by looking at the number of bills in the legislative 
session pertaining to environmental issues and then determining what percentage 
of those bills were supported by each Member of Congress or Senator.  For this 
reason, the possible scores are zero through one hundred percent.  Both scores for 
all fifty states were entered into the dataset for this study.   
The value of having federal Members of Congress in this state-level study is 
two-fold.  First, as opposed to state level districts that are very small, the districts in 
the House, and even more so in the Senate, combine various groups and 
communities and can lead to a different result than an isolated state-level district 
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with homogenous beliefs.  Second, voter turnout is higher in federal elections on 
average and so the beliefs of more citizens are represented on the federal level than 
the state. 
 
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
 
Research Question 
 
Which political and economic factors most impact the adoption of Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS) at a state level? 
 
Hypotheses 
There are two hypotheses this study will be testing.   
First, if a state has more to gain economically from growing its renewable 
energy production, then it will be more likely to have a strong RPS.  Economic gains 
will be measured in several ways including: the level of unemployment in the state, 
the state’s ability to produce renewable energy affordably, and the current level of 
fossil fuels production in the state. 
Second, if a state has (or had at the time of adoption of the RPS) a more 
pervasive ideologically liberal political climate, then it should lead to higher rates of 
adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard.   This political climate will be measured 
in a variety of ways including: Democratic Party control of the state government, the 
level of environmentalism among Members of Congress on a federal level, and the 
power of state lobbying groups representing the Energy and Utilities industry. 
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Independent Variables 
 This study tests five independent variables: 
1. State Unemployment Rates 
2. Renewable Energy Production 
3. Fossil Fuels Production 
4. Political Ideology 
5. Campaign Contributions 
 
Dependent Variable 
 This study has a single bivariate dependent variable, adoption or lack of 
adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard on a state level. 
 
 
Experimental Design 
 
As is evident in Appendix I, there is incredible diversity among states in both 
date adopted and more importantly, in the specifics of each Renewable Portfolio 
Standard.  For simplicity and clarity, this study will treat all states with an RPS as the 
same and will not consider the stringency of each standard or the progress each 
state has made towards reaching its mandated goal during testing and data analysis.  
To test the bivariate dependent variable, all data was compiled into a single 
spreadsheet that included data from 1990 to 2013 for each state.  The reason to 
begin in 1990 was due to the first Renewable Portfolio Standard being confirmed in 
1991 in Iowa.  The year 1990 was included to account for any irregularities in the 
year 1991. The data was tested using Stata statistical modeling software.  A total of 
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eight models were run through this software using variations upon two baseline 
models.  The first baseline model (Model 1A) used all available data and tested the 
energy production variables using total units of energy by source, rather than 
percentage of overall production by source.  Models 1B, 1C, and 1D operated under 
the baseline established in Model 1A.  Model 1B tested for state fixed effects, Model 
1C tested Model 1A without the campaign contributions variable, and Model 1D 
tested Model 1A with clustered standard errors by state.  The second set of models 
used a second baseline (Model 2A) that again used all data but included percentages 
of total state production by energy source instead of total units of production by 
source.  Model 2B removed campaign contributions from Model 2A, Model 2C 
included campaign contributions and tested for state fixed effects; and Model 2D 
tested Model 2A with clustered standard errors by state. 
For clarity, there are two models in each baseline that require brief 
explanations.  First, the concept of State Fixed Effects testing means that the model 
is “controlling for unobserved heterogeneity when this heterogeneity is constant 
over time…the fixed effect assumption is that the individual specific effect is 
correlated with the independent variables” (Gardiner, 2009).  In essence, the study 
is attempting to remove the effect the state innately has on the results.  This can be 
thought of as trying to eliminate the influence of “state-ness” and looking at each 
observation, or value, as completely independent of the state from which it comes.   
Second, clustering standard errors helps with the problem of non-
independence within the sample.  When there is a statistical test, there is a resulting 
set of standard errors, which shows how spread out the values in the data are.  
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However, a data set can misrepresent the data by assuming that every data point 
contributes new data, when there is the possibility that some do not.  By clustering 
standard errors, the test is removing some of the non-independence and giving a 
more accurate standard error for the data.    
Next, the statistical procedure for determining the value of the variables is 
explained.  First, the coefficient tells how much the dependent variable will 
decrease, if the coefficient is negative, or increase, if it is positive.  In Table 1 and 
Table 2, the data is reported so that the coefficient is first in each cell and the 
standard error is second in parentheses.  The percentage of impact the independent 
variable has on the dependent variable is found by dividing the coefficient by four 
and then multiplying by one hundred.  This percent of impact means that the 
dependent variable is that much more likely to occur for every one-unit change in 
the value of the independent variable.   
Second, the asterisks indicate the level of significance of the correlation 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable, as determined by P 
values.  The P value tells one how confident one can be that each independent 
variable is correlated with the dependent variable.  The number of asterisks shows 
the percentage likelihood that the independent variable is correlated with the 
dependent variable, rather than the relationship being random. A single asterisk 
indicates the study is between ninety and ninety-five percent confident in this 
correlation, a P value between <0.1 and 0.05.  Two asterisks indicate ninety-five to 
ninety-nine percent confidence in this correlation, a P value between <0.05 and 
0.01.  Three asterisks indicate above ninety-nine percent confidence in this 
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correlation, a P value score <0.01.  In order from one to three asterisks, the strength 
of significance is “significance,” “moderate significance,” and “strong significance.”   
Finally, it is important to note three data limitations that exist in this study.  
First, although twenty-nine states have adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard as 
of 2016, only twenty-eight were counted as states with a standard in this study. 
Vermont adopted a mandatory standard in 2015.  As a result, it appears not to have 
adopted a standard in the dataset because it is too recent to be included.  Second, 
data on campaign contributions was very limited on a state level before 1998.  This 
is why there was a model tested for each baseline that omitted this variable from the 
analysis.  The Stata software used omits all relevant data for every variable when 
any data is missing and so by conducting one test without campaign contributions, 
data from 1990-1997 for the other variables could be included in the results.  Third, 
data was unavailable for the party composition of the Nebraska state legislature 
because it is unicameral.  The following section will discuss the findings from this 
testing. 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
 
Data 
 
Table 1                    
 
 Model 1A 
Baseline I 
Model 1B 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Model 1C 
Campaign 
Contributions 
Omitted 
Model 1D 
Standard 
Errors 
Clustered 
Coal Production -3.47e-07 
(1.41e-07)** 
-0.0000135 
(3.78e-
06)*** 
-3.16e-07 
(1.12e-07)*** 
-3.47e-07 
(2.24e-07) 
Natural Gas 
Production 
6.12e-07 
(1.143e-07)*** 
4.85e-06 
(2.32e-
06)*** 
4.71e-07 
(1.01e-07)*** 
6.12e-07 
(2.52e-07) 
Nuclear 
Production 
-3.18e-07 
(4.45e-07) 
0.0000391 
(8e-06)*** 
2.46e-07 
(3.79e-07) 
-3.18e-07 
(9.36e-07) 
Petroleum 
Production 
-3.43e-07 
(2.93e-07) 
-0.0000105 
(2.71e-
06)*** 
-2.71e-07 
(2.16e-07) 
-3.43e-07 
(4.24e-07) 
Renewable 
Energy 
Production 
-8.79e-07 
(5.38e-07) 
0.0000333 
(5.84e-
06)*** 
-7.72e-07 
(4.20e-07) 
-8.79e-07 
(1.01e-06) 
League of 
Conservation 
Voters House 
Scores 
0.0349 
(0.0037)*** 
0.0772 
(0.0139)*** 
0.032516 
(0.0031) 
0.0349 
(0.0069)*** 
League of 
Conservation 
Voters Senate 
Scores 
0.0047 
(0.0033) 
0.104115 
(0.0219)*** 
0.004502 
(0.0026)* 
0.0047 
(0.0060) 
State 
Legislature 
Party 
Composition 
0.3133 
(0.1161)*** 
0.92842 
(0.3875)** 
0.01682 
(0.098) 
0.3133 
(0.2248) 
Campaign 
Contributions 
8.42e-08 
(6.31e-08) 
1.33e-07 
(8.08e-08) 
Omitted 8.42e-08 
(6.05-e-08) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.2878 
(0.0494)*** 
0.70846 
(0.1522)*** 
0.20941 
(0.0409)*** 
0.2878 
(0.0789)*** 
Constant -4.494 (0.4025)  -4.3767 
(0.3266)*** 
-4.494 
(0.7789)*** 
N 744 436 1176 744  
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Table 2 
 
 Model 2A 
Baseline II 
Model 2B 
Campaign 
Contributio
ns Omitted 
Model 2C 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Model 2D 
Standard 
Errors 
Clustered 
Coal Production as  
Percent of Total 
-7.194 
(19.2696) 
-1.831 
(16.5367) 
-36.182 
(37.0173) 
-7.19404 
(22.079) 
Natural Gas Production 
 as Percent of Total 
-7.1836 
(19.269) 
-1.8145 
(16.5365) 
-35.5234 
(37.0068) 
-7.183663 
(22.0719) 
Nuclear Production as 
Percent of Total 
-7.188 
(19.2696) 
-1.8223 
(16.537) 
-35.4717 
(37.0097) 
-7.188154 
(22.0777) 
Petroleum Production 
 as Percent of Total 
-7.193 
(19.2696) 
-1.829 
(16.537) 
-36.0973 
(36.992) 
-7.192955 
(22.077) 
Renewable Energy  
Production as Percent 
of Total 
-7.1797 
(19.2695) 
-1.8173 
(16.536) 
-35.3764 
(37.0063) 
-7.179708 
(22.0772) 
League of Conservation 
Voters House Scores 
0.0274 
(0.0034)*** 
0.02794 
(0.0029) 
0.064428 
(0.1216)*** 
0.0274314 
(0.0062)*** 
League of Conservation 
Voters Senate Scores 
0.00323 
(0.0029) 
0.00253 
(0.0027) 
0.057085 
(0.0172)*** 
0.0032278 
(0.0044) 
State Legislature Party  
Composition 
0.3145 
(0.1156)*** 
0.0215 
(0.0978) 
0.55968 
(0.3496) 
0.3144855 
(0.2358) 
Campaign  
Contributions 
2.05e-07 
(6.30e-
08)*** 
Omitted 1.15e-07 
(9.11e-08) 
2.05e-07 
(8.91e-
08)** 
Unemployment Rate 0.2576 
(0.0469) 
0.22001 
(0.0393) 
0.78388 
(0.1636)*** 
0.2576276 
(0.0678)*** 
Constant 714.574 
(1926.927) 
178.1422 
(1653.651) 
 714.5738 
(2207.88) 
N 744 1176 436 744 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Economic Factors as Drivers of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
State Unemployment Rates 
In order to test this variable within the economic hypothesis, unemployment 
data was collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for each state dating back to 
1990.  The data range allows for analysis of the unemployment data before and after 
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an RPS was adopted, as well as an overall comparison between the unemployment 
rates of states with an RPS versus those without a mandatory standard.  The 
hypothesis predicts to see states with higher levels of unemployment be more likely 
to adopt an RPS.  The rationale is that there is job growth opportunity in developing 
the renewable energy sector and so states with the most need economically should 
be more motivated to consider this option.  
 The testing shows strong support for this hypothesis.  In six out of eight 
models, strong significance was found for the unemployment variable.  Under 
Baseline One, all models found the strongest level of significance.  Under Baseline 
Two, the unemployment rate was found to be of strong significance when tested 
with Models 2C and 2D, but was not significant for Models 2A and 2B.  The next 
consideration in determining how impactful this variable is on the dependent 
variable is through looking at the Coefficient values.  In Logit regression models, the 
correlational strength can be found by dividing the Coefficient by four and then 
multiplying by one hundred to arrive at a percentage of impact.  The percentage of 
impact in the six models in which unemployment rate was a significant variable was 
the following in order: 7.195%, 17.713%, 5.235%, 7.195%, 19.598%, and 6.44%.  To 
reach a number that can be compared against other variables, an average will be 
used, which for unemployment rate is 10.561%.  This means that for the six models 
in which this variable was seen to be significant, seventy-five percent of the models 
tested, with every one percent rise in unemployment in a state, there was a 
10.561% greater chance that an RPS would be adopted.  The results are significant 
because they show a correlation between adoption of a RPS and unemployment.   
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Current Reliance on Renewable Energy and Future Capacity 
 Using information from the Energy Information Administration, the 
percentage of each energy source as a total of each states’ energy portfolio was 
obtained.  There are considerable variations across the country in how energy is 
produced but one thing is true across the vast majority of states, with or without a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard: forty-one states produce the majority of their energy 
from fossil fuels.  The economic hypothesis for this variable would predict to see 
states with higher reliance on renewable energy be more likely to have a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard.  States with higher capacity, whether it is because of natural 
occurring resources or better transmission abilities are expected to be more likely 
to have an RPS because it is easier for these states to adapt to the mandated 
renewable energy production. 
 The results of this test do not support the hypothesis, as only one of eight 
models showed any correlation between this independent variable and the 
dependent variable.  The one test with significance was Model 1B, state fixed effects 
testing, with the highest level of significance.  However, when calculating the 
percentage of impact on adoption of an RPS, the variable has very little effect; the 
level of significance is only 0.0008325%.  This means that even when there was 
observed correlation, the impact renewable energy production had on adoption of 
an RPS was nearly irrelevant.   
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Current Fossil Fuels Production 
The United States produces some amount of Fossil Fuels in all fifty states for 
a total of 77,528 trillion Btu’s of energy each year.  Three sources of energy: crude 
oil, natural gas, and coal, will be considered Fossil Fuels for this study.  The 
economic hypothesis expects to see an inverse relationship between fossil fuels 
production and the likelihood of RPS adoption.  This is explained because states 
with more reliance on the fossil fuels industry to power the economy should be less 
likely to support policy that initiates a shift away from fossil fuels.   
To determine the significance of this variable on adoption, data was used 
from the three sources of energy considered fossil fuels.  The results of this testing 
does not strongly support the hypothesis, although there is moderate or strong 
significance between the variable and adoption in certain models.  Both coal and 
natural gas production were found to be strongly significant in Models 1A, 1B, and 
1C.  Petroleum was only significant in Model 1B.  The percentages of impact 
however, across the board for every significant variable test, were so small that the 
variables have almost no influence on the dependent variable.  The highest of these, 
coal production in Model 1B, only yields an impact of 0.00000338%, with all other 
tests being even less.  The results of the testing for the relationship between fossil 
fuels production and the adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard showed that 
while the variable may be significant in certain cases, the level of impact fossil fuels 
production has on RPS adoption is extremely low.  These results begin to explain 
why states with more to lose economically from energy reform tend to avoid it.   
 
 36 
Political Factors as drivers of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Democratic Party Control as a Reflection of Public Opinion 
For this factor of the political hypothesis, two data sets were utilized to 
determine Democratic Party control and the level of support for environmental 
policy.  The first came from the National Conference of State Legislatures that 
measured which party controlled each state legislature: Democrats, Republicans, or 
a split in the bicameral system.  The second data source was the annual 
Environmental Scorecard published by the League of Conservation Voters; this 
provided a way to compare the level of environmental concern of federal-level 
Members of Congress.  The hypothesis for this variable predicts to see a positive 
relationship between Democratic or liberal control and the rate of adoption of a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard. 
Overall, the results of this test support the hypothesis, with some exceptions.  
Three factors were tested to determine the significance of this factor including: State 
Legislature Party Composition and the League of Conservation Voters’ 
environmental scores for both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  The 
House of Representatives scores were found to be the most significant, followed by 
the party composition, and then the Senate scores.  
First, of the eight models against which it was tested, the House scores were 
found to be strongly significant six times; significance was found in Models 1A, 1B, 
1D, 2A, 2C, and 2D.  As opposed to many other variables with significance, the 
Coefficients for this variable were higher and so the level of impact on adoption was 
higher.  Of the six instances in which House scores were significant, the average 
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Coefficient is 0.0444, meaning the average percentage of impact was 1.11%.  This 
means that for every point increase in the environmental score, there was a 1.11% 
increase in likelihood of RPS adoption.  
Second, the Party Composition showed significance to the dependent 
variable in three of the eight models, Models 1A, 1B, and 2A.  This factor has a higher 
Coefficient value for the models in which there were significance than the other two 
in this variable.  The average Coefficient for the three significant models is 0.51874 
and the impact is 12.97%.  This means that for every time a legislature increased 
one coded point, from either Republican control to split control, or from split 
control to Democratic control, there was a 12.97% increase in likelihood of RPS 
adoption. This level of impact shows that although the state legislature’s 
composition is not always significant, but when it is,  it has a tremendous positive 
impact on RPS adoption.   
Third, the Senate scores showed significance in three of the eight tests, 
Models 1B, 1C, and 2C.  This variable has an average Coefficient of 0.552 and a 
1.38% impact on the rate of adoption.  This means that for every point increase in 
the environmental score, there was a 1.38% increase in likelihood of RPS adoption.  
 
Campaign Contributions 
While money has always played a role in influencing policy adoption, 
contributions, which are increasing rapidly, now play an even larger role in 
determining how government officials act.  Since 2010, when Citizens United v. FEC   
decided, “corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate 
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elections cannot be limited,” the amount of money in politics has grown 
exponentially (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Oyez).  Between the 
2008 and 2012 elections, total campaign contributions increased by 307 percent 
from 2.3 billion dollars to 7.04 billion dollars in four years (National Institute on 
Money in State Politics (NIMSP)).  Additionally, over two years, between 2008 and 
2010, the energy and utilities industry increased contributions by 33 percent 
(NIMSP).  This influx of money has increased the influence of special interests in 
politics and has blocked nearly all state adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards; 
there has been only one state, Vermont, to adopt a mandatory standard since the 
Citizen’s United ruling nearly six years ago.   
 This study focuses on campaign contributions and how they have impacted 
the adoption or lack of adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards.  The political 
hypothesis would expect to see an inverse relationship between the amount of 
campaign contributions from the Energy and Utility sector and the rate of RPS 
adoption.  The reasoning behind this thinking is that it is expected that this industry 
will devote increased resources towards blocking the passage of the standard 
because energy companies have vested interests in maintaining the status quo that 
an RPS would disrupt.  
 The testing in this hypothesis did not strongly support the hypothesis.  This 
variable was tested with only six models after one intentional omission per baseline 
model.  Of the six models in which it was included, only two, Model 2B and Model 
2D, showed any level of significance.  While there may be moderate to strong 
significance in these two models, the percentage of impact is extremely low after 
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considering the coefficients.  The percentage of impact was 5.01e-08% for both 
models, a number so small that the true effect of the variable on influencing 
adoption of an RPS is negligible.   
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V. Conclusion 
 
 
Future Implications 
 This study tested two broad hypotheses, each with a series of variables, for a 
total of five independent variables.  Of these five, two variables, unemployment rate 
and political ideology are significantly correlated to the adoption of Renewable 
Portfolio Standards.  The results show that high unemployment rate correlates 
strongly with RPS adoption and that more liberal and environmentally concerned 
legislators, both on state and federal levels, are correlated with higher adoption as 
well.  There still remain twenty-one states without a mandatory Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, leaving the question: which states are most likely to adopt this 
policy next?  Given that high unemployment and Democratic ideology are the most 
correlated with adoption, by looking at states that currently have high 
unemployment levels or Democratic state legislatures, a prediction can be made.   
First, the three states without an RPS that have the highest unemployment 
rates, all above six percent, are Alabama at 6.2 percent, Alaska at 6.6 percent and 
Mississippi at 6.7 percent unemployment (Unemployment Rates for States, 2016).  
Given the strong evidence that adoption of an RPS is correlated to high 
unemployment rates, it is reasonable to assume that theses states have a higher 
likelihood than others to pursue the RPS.  Furthermore, in 2009, Alaska enacted 
House Bill 306, which set a goal that “the state receive 50 percent of its electrical 
generation from renewable sources by 2025” (Durkay, 2015). While this is not a 
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mandatory standard, it signals a desire of the people of Alaska to change the energy 
infrastructure of the state.   
Second, there are only three states that have not adopted an RPS that do not 
currently have Republican controlled Congresses: Kentucky and Virginia are split 
and West Virginia is Democrat controlled (2014 Legislative Partisan Composition, 
2014).  It is reasonable to assume that these states may be more likely to adopt an 
RPS in the near future.  However, West Virginia presents an interesting potential 
exception because it is the one state to have adopted an RPS, in 2009, and have it 
repealed, in 2015.  The fact that the standard was just eliminated may reduce the 
chance of its reinstatement in the near future.  Looking ahead, there are many states 
in which a Renewable Portfolio Standard is a possible policy but most that have not 
already adopted one are not expected to do so in the near future because they do 
not possess the variables found in the study to be correlated with adoption.   
 
Limitations to the Study 
This study was as thorough as possible given time and resources, but there 
are many things it did not cover.   First, there are two ways in which the dependent 
variable was simplified that altered the analysis.  Renewable Portfolio Standards 
were all treated as equal as long as they set a mandatory renewable energy 
requirement by a set year.  This choice was intentional because it maintained 
consistency among the standards and increased clarity in comparing them.  
However, it prevented the tests from accounting for the stringency of each standard 
or the progress each state has made towards the goal.  For example, Washington, 
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which mandates that fifteen percent of its energy come from renewable sources by 
2020 was treated as being equal to Hawaii, which mandates having thirty percent 
renewable energy by the same year.  In addition to the stringency being treated 
equally, progress towards satisfying the RPS was not measured.  These two factors 
were excluded because creating a system to score these factors would be very 
difficult and confusing.  The system seems easy enough when looking at stringency 
or progress singularly, but combining them into a single scoring scale is difficult.  
For example, should a state with an ambitious goal but slow progress be given a 
higher or lower score than a state with a conservative goal but more steady 
progress?  These questions became too difficult for this study and so the bivariate 
dependent variable was utilized.   
In addition to difficulties with the dependent variable, there were 
imperfections in how certain independent variables were measured.  While data for 
some variables, like unemployment rate, renewable energy production, and fossil 
fuels production, was fully available, political ideology and campaign contributions 
were not.  Political ideology is difficult to measure perfectly because there is not a 
magical number that tells the whole story for every person in each state.  The study 
used legislators, both on the state and federal levels, to represent the views of the 
greater constituency.  However, while the people elect these representatives, their 
actions do not perfectly align with the beliefs of all their constituents.  This strategy 
also excludes the influence the Executive Branch, like the President or Governor, has 
on policy decisions and voting.  The ideal information to test this variable would be 
a survey of as many people in each state as possible with questions aimed at 
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identifying how each respondent views environmental policy and whether they 
more closely align with liberal or conservative beliefs.   
The second data set that was not fully sufficient was the information for 
campaign contributions.  This data was limited for two reasons: the preciseness of 
the data sought and the timeline needed.  Campaign contribution information is 
most available on the federal level and is much more limited on the state level.  
Additionally, this study only wanted data on contributions from the Energy and 
Utilities industry, further limiting the results.  Unfortunately, this level of specificity 
was not reliable or available before 1998, leaving the eight years from 1990 to 1998 
without statistics.  This constrained the regression model because it left around one-
third of the years in the model without complete data for all variables, effectively 
removing them from most of the models tested.   
This study was not perfect for a number of reasons.  It did not test all aspects 
of the dependent variable, nor was it able to obtain perfect statistical data for all of 
the independent variables it sought to test.  However, this experiment was still 
successful in testing the variables it set out to test with the most accuracy possible 
and the results should still be considered valid within the intended scope.  
 
Final Thoughts 
Government action on climate change began in the 1970s but it was not until 
the 1990s that states acted, independent of the federal government to combat the 
perceived warming of the planet.  While there are many policy options for a state in 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions, one that has become increasingly popular is 
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the Renewable Portfolio Standard.  An RPS is a requirement for a set percentage of a 
state’s energy portfolio to be produced from renewable sources by a specified date.   
There is significant debate over the effectiveness of these standards but what is 
important is what they represent: the increasing concern and action being taken at 
the state level to overcome federal inaction in addressing this issue.  States from all 
over the country are adopting these standards despite both political and economic 
obstacles.  This study attempted to determine which variables most impact state 
adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard.  Among the variables tested in this 
study, those that were correlated to greater adoption of an RPS are: state 
unemployment rate and political ideology.  The other factors tested, renewable 
energy production, fossil fuels production and campaign contributions did not yield 
significant correlations to adoption.  Although twenty-nine states have a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, there is still much more to be done in the future to both improve 
existing policies and to see more states, or even the federal government, adopt this 
type of policy.  
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VI. Appendix 
I 
States that currently have mandated Renewable Portfolio Standards (and the year of 
adoption and level of renewable energy mandated by a certain year in the standard) 
Arizona; 2006; 15% by 2025, California; 2002; 33% by 2020, 40% by 2024, 
45% by 2027, 50% by 2030, Colorado; 2004; 30% by 2020 for Investor-Owned 
Utilities (IOUs), 10%-20% for municipalities and electric cooperatives, depending 
on size, Connecticut; 1998; 27% by 2020, Delaware; 2005; 25% by 2025-2026, 
Hawaii; 2001; 30% by 2020, 40% by 2030, 70% by 2040, 100% by 2045, Illinois; 
2007; 25% by 2015-2016, Iowa; 1983; 105 MW of generating capacity for IOUs, 
Maine; 1999; 40% by 2017, Maryland; 2004; 20% by 2022, Massachusetts; 1997; 
Class I: 15% by 2020 and an additional 1% each year after, Class II: 7.1% by 2009, 
Michigan; 2008; 10% by 2015, Minnesota; 2007; 26.5% by 2025 (IOUs), 25% by 
2025 (other utilities), Missouri; 2007; 15% by 2021 (IOUs), Montana; 2005; 15% by 
2015, Nevada; 1997; 25% by 2025, New Hampshire; 2007; 24.8% by 2025, New 
Jersey; 1999; 24.5% by 2020, New Mexico; 2002; 20% by 2020 (IOUs), 10% by 2020 
(co-ops), New York; 2004; 29% by 2015, 50% by 2030, North Carolina; 2007; 12.5% 
by 2021 (IOUs), 10% by 2018 (municipalities and coops), Ohio; 2008; 25% by 2024, 
Oregon; 2007; 25% by 2025 (utilities with 3% or more of the state’s load), 10% by 
2025 (utilities with 1.5% - 3% of the state's load), 5% by 2025 (utilities with less 
than 1.5% of the state’s load), Pennsylvania; 2004; 18% by 2020-2021, Rhode 
Island; 2004; 16% by 2019, Texas; 1999; 5,880 MW by 2015, 10,000 MW by 2025, 
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Vermont; 2015; 55% by 2017, 75% by 2032, Washington; 2006; 9% by 2016, 15% 
by 2020, and Wisconsin; 1998; 10% by 2015.  
 
States with voluntary RPS include: 
Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Utah, and Virginia.  For the purposes of this study, these states, due to them being 
without a mandatory standard, will be grouped with states in which Renewable 
Portfolio Standards are absent.   
 
States without an RPS include: 
Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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